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Casting a Critical Glance at Teaching “Critical 
Thinking” 
  
Michael DeCesare 1 
 
I. 
If there is one word that characterizes all three of the thoughtful articles in the “Teaching and 
Learning Amidst Diversity” section of this inaugural issue of Pedagogy and the Human 
Sciences, that word is critical; indeed, the word is in two of the papers‟ titles. Perhaps this is as it 
should be. From the corridors of the White House to the hallways of American schools, critical 
has long been one of the buzzwords in the ongoing national conversation about higher 
education. Critical thinking skills, as well as the abilities to read and write critically, are 
cornerstone ideals—if not demonstrable realities—of schooling in this country. It is difficult to 
find a course syllabus, a department mission statement, or a college vision statement that does 
not highlight the word critical. It seems, in fact, that learning to be “critical” long ago became 
critical. 
 
Like all buzzwords, though, the term critical has come to include so many different—and 
disparate—characteristics, that it long ago lost any true meaning in higher education. Judging 
from the literature on teaching so-called “critical skills,” to be critical is to be, by turns, 
thoughtful, democratic, concerned about social justice, personal, honest, or simply active in the 
classroom. Surely, to be critical must mean to be something narrower, more defined and 
definite; it must be something less trendy than the professional educator‟s fashion du jour. 
Mustn‟t it?  
 
II. 
Some Critical Thinking about Critical Thinking 
At this point, we simply do not know. Given the ubiquity in higher education of the adjective 
“critical”, as well as the lip-service paid to the concept by administrators and educators across 
the country, surprisingly little scholarship has tried to answer a fundamental question: What, in 
actual practice, does it mean to be a critical thinker2? Each of the three articles in the “Teaching 
and Learning Amidst Diversity” section of this issue of Pedagogy and the Human Sciences 
offers a thoughtful, thought not entirely satisfactory, answer. If the authors of these articles have 
left me unsatisfied, it is due in a much larger part to the mercurial nature of the term critical 
than to the limitations of their scholarship.  
                                                 
1
Michael DeCesare, Department of Sociology, Merrimack College, 315 Turnpike Street, North Andover, MA 01845, 
decesarem@merrimack.edu 
2 Like the authors of the papers I am discussing, I am primarily concerned here with critical thinking, as 
opposed to critical writing and critical reading. 
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Harkins and Wells lead off by describing an in-class exercise in conflict resolution, in order to 
draw a distinction between critical and discursive pedagogy. The goal of their exercise—asking 
students to grade one another on weekly quizzes, and then giving each student the options of 
accepting the grade or negotiating for a different one—was “to uncover the subjective nature of 
truth and the difficulties inherent in deciding whose truth matters” (p. 41). There can be no 
doubt that such a goal is properly classified under the heading “critical thinking.”  
But in the case described by Harkins and Wells, the intended result came troublingly close to 
being overshadowed by some unintended consequences. First, the authors found that “[m]any 
students were frustrated and only a few students understood the relevance of exploring the issue 
deeply from the beginning” (p. 47). In addition, despite the fact that “the major goal of the 
course was to teach about conflicts, many students thought that the teacher should be telling 
students the answer and grading them on whether or not they had memorized it” (p. 47). These 
observations are telling for a couple of reasons.  
First, there is a fine line to walk between engaging students in something with which they are 
unfamiliar and uncomfortable, and frustrating them. Of course, one should encounter some 
frustration in the process of thinking critically about any subject. But the degree of frustration 
that seems to have characterized the course described by Harkins and Wells begs the question: 
How many students actually learned something valuable as a result of this exercise? If “few” 
understood the importance of the exercise, and “many” believed the teacher should simply be 
providing the answer, then the answer would seem to be a small number. 
Second, and perhaps more important, teaching critical thinking skills is not a one-way street, as 
we typically seem to think; it requires consent, as well as a certain degree of willingness, on the 
part of our students. If our students are unwilling, or unable, to meet us halfway, little to no 
room will be left for the development of critical thinking skills. Given some of the trends 
described by Wells and Harkins in their second article on “Teaching the Diversity Course in 
Conservative Times,” one wonders about one‟s chances of even leading the horses to the well, let 
alone of convincing them to take a drink. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Harkins decided to halt the exercise at the end of the sixth week, at 
which point “at least half of the students were frustrated at their own inability to reach a 
decision” (p. 47). Still, the authors—somewhat inexplicably—deemed the exercise a success 
because students “recognized the value in addressing the deeper issues of fairness, perspective-
taking, and social justice through an activity in which they actively chose to participate” (p. 47). 
Harkins and Wells go on to argue that students “learned that they must stand up for their rights 
and listen to other voices” and were provided “the opportunity to affirm their own histories 
through social practices, language, and content that are respectful of their own cultural 
experiences” (p 47-48). And the instructors themselves “provide[d] the resources needed for 
students to become active participants in shaping their futures” (p. 48). 
These supposed benefits of the exercise strike me as much less about critical thinking than about 
what educators have recently been calling “active learning”, “personal empowerment”, and 
“cultural sensitivity.” Teaching students to stand up for themselves and to listen to others does 
not teach them critical thinking skills. It teaches them the importance of empowering 
themselves and being sensitive to the views of others. Requiring students to actively participate 
in an in-class exercise does not teach them critical thinking skills either. It teaches them to value 
active learning (and to obey the instructor). Finally, teaching students to understand and respect 
their own experiences does not teach them critical thinking skills. It teaches them, once again, 
the importance of personal empowerment. By the end of Harkins and Wells‟ article, one is left 
with too vague a notion of what the adjective “critical” really means, whether it is used to 
describe teaching, pedagogy, or thinking.  
2
Pedagogy and the Human Sciences, Vol. 1 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://scholarworks.merrimack.edu/phs/vol1/iss1/4
DeCesare 




In the second article, about teaching introductory psychology at HBCUs (historically black 
colleges and universities), Michele Lewis and Anna Lee suggest that critical consciousness 
“represents the capacity to both critically reflect upon and act upon one‟s sociopolitical 
environment” (p. 50, italics mine).3 The authors are very clear about their dual emphases on 
“developing students‟ capability for reflection and [teaching students to take] action against 
injustices” (p. 58). Being “critical”, from Lewis and Lee‟s perspective, means being reflective and 
active. 
Reflecting seems like a good first step on the path toward becoming critical. But the second 
aspect of the authors‟ definition of critical consciousness, namely acting upon one‟s 
environment, seems problematic. After all, teaching students to reflect is one thing; teaching 
them to act is quite another. Indeed, the authors—in a turn of phrasing that would likely send 
shivers up even Orwell‟s spine—chillingly refer to “a type of structured programming” that could 
profitably take place in the psychology classroom (p. 51). If helping students develop their 
critical faculties involves “programming” them, then we need to seriously reconsider in their 
entirety the purpose and meaning of higher education.  
On some level, Lewis and Lee understand this. That may be why they explain quite well the 
reflective component of each of the six topics they typically cover in the general psychology 
course (i.e., stress and health, identity development, personality, sensation and perception, 
learning and conditioning, and research methods), but do a decidedly poorer job of explaining 
exactly how they incorporate the active component of critical consciousness into these six 
topics.  
The authors claim, for example, that their students‟ responses to the stress and health section of 
the course are “adequately inclusive of suggestions for the creation of non-profits, schools, and 
community programs” (p. 54). Regarding identity development, all we are told is that the 
authors assign points to their students‟ assignments, in part, based on the students‟ suggestions 
for “actions they feel psychologists could take to address social problems” (p. 54). Of the topic of 
personality, they argue that “the possibilities are endless for students to take sociopolitical 
action and affect change in the trans community” (p. 55). In the section of their article on 
“Sensation and Perception” the authors provide one “example of the action component of critical 
consciousness development”: A student who was motivated by the in-class discussion to pursue 
independent research about “whether there are dating services for sensory challenged persons” 
(p. 56). An assignment in the “Learning and Conditioning” section of the course allows the 
authors “to present to students how the research of psychologists addresses social problems” (p. 
57). Finally, in the process of discussing research methods, Lewis and Lee “provide students 
with evidence of how research in applied social psychology has the potential to produce findings 
that bring about social change” (p. 57). 
By failing to convincingly or even fully describe how they teach their students to act upon their 
“sociopolitical environment”, Lewis and Lee demonstrate the limitations of their conception and 
                                                 
3 I should mention here that I have limited myself to a critique of Lewis and Lee‟s conception of critical 
consciousness. But an additional question could be raised about their article: What exactly about the 
authors‟ argument—focusing overwhelmingly as it does on the general development of students‟ critical 
consciousness—is unique to the HBCU context? Lewis and Lee argue that “the pedagogy for psychology at 
the HBCU should incorporate contextually relevant socio-cultural and critical consciousness perspectives 
into every course”, but the same argument could, and probably should, be made about teaching 
psychology at any college or university. In addition, the authors then seem to dismiss their own emphasis 
on HBCUs by suggesting that the focus of the curriculum should be not only on race and ethnicity, but 
also on aging, disability, gender, and sexual orientation (pp. 51-52). Thus, the reader is forced to ask: 
What about the authors‟ pedagogy is unique to the HBCU context?  In my view, Lewis and Lee have not 
adequately answered this question. 
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definition of critical consciousness. Like Harkins and Wells, they leave their readers with an 
incomplete, and therefore unsatisfactory, description of what it means to be “critical.” For 
Harkins and Wells, being critical involves frankly discussing “fairness, perspective-taking, and 
social justice”, teaching students to stand up for their rights and to listen to others‟ perspectives, 
and giving students the opportunity to affirm the importance of their own cultural backgrounds 
and experiences (p 47). For Lewis and Lee, it involves reflecting upon a vague construct they call 
the “sociopolitical environment.” These are two very different definitions of being “critical.” 
The third and final article, Wells and Harkins‟ piece on teaching a course on diversity during 
“conservative times”, rests on the assumption that we are, in fact, living in “conservative times.” 
The authors claim that everything from cultural sensitivity, to beliefs in the importance of 
community research and in self-examination among instructors, are under attack during these 
oppressive times of living “in the shadow” (p. 69). It is unclear, however, whether the authors 
believe the attack is confined to academic psychology or is being perpetrated against the entirety 
of academia, or both. 
Regardless, it is difficult to swallow Wells and Harkins‟ argument, which is clearly critical of 
“conservative thinking”.4 For one, it is characterized by too many unsubstantiated claims, like 
the one we encounter as the first sentence of the paper: “Shifting conversations in American 
politics, from liberal to conservative are reshaping the basis for multi-cultural and diversity 
courses in academic psychology” (p. 60). Two pages later, we read: “Differences that threaten 
the status-quo are now more likely to be punished and adjusted, rather than celebrated and 
studied” (p. 62). And again:   
The teaching of future clinicians and researchers in the field of psychology has become 
constrained and limited in terms of the course materials deemed acceptable, the value 
placed on diversity courses by certain departments of psychology, the likely reaction of 
undergraduate and graduate students who attend diversity courses and the methods that 
can be used to present material in psychology classes. (p. 63)  
Unfortunately, the authors provide virtually no evidence, very few recent citations, and almost 
no support for these or any of the other claims they rely upon to make their case. In addition, I 
would suggest that their claims fly in the face of the daily experiences of most academics. 
The little evidence that Wells and Harkins do offer is flimsy at best. Regarding their argument 
that course material, pedagogical methods, and course design may be restricted during times 
when conservative thinking dominates, the authors offer the example of Mary Daly, the radical 
feminist and Boston College professor who was forced to retire in the late 1990s “after a decade 
of teaching „all female‟ college courses about women‟s issues” (p. 63). But Daly‟s retirement 
came in the middle of President Clinton‟s second term—hardly a “conservative time” by any 
measure. In addition, it should be noted that Daly‟s “retirement” came several years before the 
supposed “post-911 . . . shift[. . .] toward greater concerns about controlling tyrannical elements 
among diverse, underrepresented people, in and outside of America” (p. 63).  
One of Harkins and Wells‟ conclusions is this: “Everything about the design of a course, from 
procedures for grading to outside of classroom, hands-on experiences can become a source of 
contention where more conservative thinking prevails” (p. 64). In response, I would ask: Could 
the same not be said of periods in which more liberal thinking prevails? To put it differently, if 
we substitute the term “liberal” for the term “conservative” in the quoted sentence, how does the 
                                                 
4 I put this term in quotation marks because the authors themselves are hard-pressed to define it (see pp. 
60-61). I also do not pretend to have a succinct definition in mind or at hand. 
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authors‟ argument change? I do not believe it does—unless one has a political or ideological axe 
to grind.  
III. 
Final Thoughts 
To think critically is to do more than simply reflect on what one has read or heard. Critical 
thinking also involves more than just shaking one‟s head and wagging one‟s finger at one‟s 
ideological or political opponents. Thinking critically must be more than proclaiming one‟s own 
argument correct and everyone else‟s incorrect. So what is it, then?  
Though I am reluctant to offer yet another definition of critical thinking here, it may be 
instructive to briefly examine the etymology of the English word critic. The term is derived from 
the Greek word kritikos, meaning “skilled in judging” or “able to make judgments or discern.” 
As college professors, we wish to teach our students to discern between good and bad, to judge 
right and wrong, to distinguish correct from incorrect. We wish to teach them, as the American 
Heritage dictionary‟s definition of the term critic puts it, to form and express judgments of the 
merits, faults, value, or truth of a matter. We wish, in other words, to teach our students the 
value of reason, of empirical evidence, of logic, of thoughtfulness, in discovering and uncovering, 
as nearly as possible, “facts” and “truths” about the social world.  
Perhaps we give ourselves the best chance of being successful by asking students to undertake 
research projects like those described by Misra (1997). Maybe we can most effectively teach 
critical thinking by requiring students to analyze current news stories, as Malcom (2006) does. 
Perhaps critical thinking skills develop most fully as a result of one or all of the suggestions 
made by the authors of the three articles that I have critiqued here. Or maybe all of these 
authors have it wrong.  
I put the words facts and truths in quotation marks above to denote that some facts and truths 
are more factual and truthful than others. Regardless of whether we require research projects or 
media analyses, whether we subscribe to critical or discursive pedagogy, whether we teach at a 
historically black college or some other type of institution, or whether we teach during 
conservative times or liberal times, it is our responsibility, our only purpose really, to teach 
students how to find the most factual facts and truthful truths—and then to ask questions about 
them.  
To do so, I believe, is to truly teach critical thinking. 
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